Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of avoidance strategies developed by small-scale shrimp fishermen in response to externally imposed regulations that limit their access to marine resources. The main issue that will be explored is whether fishermen act as individuals who calculate costs and benefits associated with noncompliance; or as community members who break the rules in order to serve collective interests within the communities.
Keywords: marine resources, enforcement avoidance strategies, small-scale fishermen, shrimp, methodological individualism, collective behavior, fishery management
How to Cite:
León, M. V., (1994) “Avoidance Strategies and Governmental Rigidity: The Case of the Small-Scale Shrimp Fishery in two Mexican Communities”, Journal of Political Ecology 1(1), 67-82. doi: https://doi.org/10.2458/v1i1.21157
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