Abstract

The religious freedom clause of the first amendment is not one of "the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution." Judges have wrestled with its imprecision for nearly a century in efforts to define the extent of individual religious freedom. The language of the free exercise provision, which has been described as "at best opaque," was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in 1879 in Reynolds v. United States, the Mormon plural marriage case. The concepts flowing from Reynolds, which still have a viable but reduced role in refining the meaning of the free exercise guarantee, were to cast the molds for subsequent interpretations of religious freedom.

To what extent has the impact of Reynolds been diminished? During the past 100 years the religious issues have been different from those of the polygamy cases, but the constitutional issues have been similar. No longer are courts as concerned with defining the scope of religion or determining whether governmental activity inhibits belief or action. Instead, courts consider whether religious acts can be inhibited because of some compelling state interest, and the compelling quality of society's interest is considered in light of alternative means of protecting the public. That approach, though, owes much to the basic decision in Reynolds that the free exercise clause is not an absolute guarantee, and to its example in weighing societal interests in deciding whether to uphold an individual's claim that his freedom to practice religion has been infringed. In view of this significant constitutional development, it is appropriate to return to the Reynolds decision and evaluate the issues it has generated and its impact upon the exercise of religious liberty.

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