Abstract

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues that people have natural rights which limit what other people, including agents of the state, may do to them. His argument appeals to our beliefs about when it is permissible for one person acting alone in a state of nature to use force against another person. More specifically, he appeals to our beliefs about when it is permissible for one person to use force against another when we focus on specific problems between two people whose moral relations have not been complicated by any of the following: prior state action; nonabundance of natural resources; or the existence of institutions which (i) specify that certain actions are forbidden and others required, (ii) specify that those who act contrary to these pronouncements will be subjected to punishment, and (iii) succeed in fixing people's expectations about how others will act. When we focus on these specific problems we will, supposedly, arrive at clear beliefs about what principles should be used to solve them and what "root ideas" justify using those principles. The principles will include a list of natural rights—those held by people in the state of nature and not dependent on the existence of institutions.

Nozick's list of natural rights includes: a right to one's body; a right to one's labor; a right to make contracts; a right to whatever property one has legitimately acquired; a right to choose one's life plan; and a right to enforce one's natural rights. He believes that once we understand these rights we will be able to solve many, but not all problems concerning when it is permissible for one person acting alone in the state of nature to use force against another.

Why should we accept Nozick's list of natural rights? He believes 
that the best explanation must appeal to the following root ideas:

1. No person can be sacrificed for the benefit of any other person.
2. Each person must be treated as an end and never merely as a means.
3. No person is a resource for any other person.
4. Each person is individually responsible for choosing his life plan.

When Nozick concedes that his book "does not present a precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights" he is conceding that he has not established either that his root ideas, as he interprets them, are the appropriate ones for a correct moral theory, or that there are valid arguments in which his root ideas appear as premises and his moral principles, including his account of natural rights, appear as conclusions. In this Article I will, for the purpose of argument, assume that his root ideas are appropriate and that they can be used to establish his account of natural rights. I will examine whether they can also be used to establish other moral principles which determine when it is permissible for one person to use force against another. I will argue that they cannot be used to establish some of the additional principles which are essential to the moral theory which Nozick defends.

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