Abstract

Contemporary events have caused legal educators and practitioners of law to be more concerned about their professional ethics, a phenomenon reflected for the most part by increasing emphasis on the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Efforts to increase the awareness of law students and lawyers about professional responsibility are laudable, but emphasis solely on the disciplinary rules as the mechanism through which the legal profession polices itself is somewhat misleading. In fact, there are several devices available to police the legal profession. In the process of sorting out unethical attorney conduct and applying sanctions to that conduct, courts may utilize criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings, injunctive proceedings, actions for damages or proceedings for denial of fees, declaration of mistrial because of conduct of attorneys, summary proceedings, and grievance proceedings under state bar acts.

Of all the sanctions applied to lawyers, disbarment is undoubtedly the most feared and obviously the most effective. Contrary to popular belief, however, disbarment is not always based on a violation of a disciplinary rule, nor is it always linked to a procedure of a state bar grievance committee. Our modem notions about disbarment, and its supposed relation to the Code of Professional Responsibility and state bar committees, overlook the history of disbarment and its connection with the inherent power of courts to control those who appear as advocates.

Although a court obviously has the power to enter a judgment of disbarment, the not-so-obvious question remains as to whether in doing so, a court may employ grounds or procedures different from those established in the Code or a state bar act. It is the purpose of this article to review the summary power of a court to disbar lawyers—a power that is completely outside the framework of the Code of Professional Responsibility and prescribed state bar disciplinary procedures.

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