Abstract

The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to restrict state regulations that interfere with interstate commerce. This corollary doctrine is called the dormant commerce clause. Over the years, state liquor pricing schemes have come under constitutional scrutiny through the dormant commerce clause.

Generally, state liquor pricing statutes attempt to secure for state residents liquor prices comparable to those offered in other states. Thus, these statutes usually require a distiller to offer the lowest price that the distiller offers in other states. Inherently, these statutory schemes have interstate impact.

In Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, the Court addressed this issue in upholding a liquor price statute that required distillers to offer the lowest price that it offered in other states the month before. Recently, in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in holding that a prospective liquor price affirmation statute violated the dormant commerce clause. However, the Court did not overrule Seagram, but left its future in doubt.

In his concurring opinion in Brown-Forman, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's failure to overrule Seagram will lead to uncertainty and ultimately to further litigation over the constitutionality of retrospective price affirmation statutes. Since Arizona is the only state that currently has a retrospective price affirmation statute, the Brown-Forman decision is a particularly important decision to Arizona.

In the following pages, this Comment will detail the facts of Brown-Forman, examine the relevant caselaw, and analyze the impact of the decision on liquor price affirmation statutes.

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