Abstract

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes discrimination against any individual on the basis of sex. This statute reflects the modem view of equality that requires equal employment opportunities for men and women. Sex differences may not be used as barriers to block women from positions deemed strictly male. Nor may employers discriminate in compensation or benefits solely because of an employee's sex.

Problems arise when the term "equal" is interpreted to mean "identical." Because of the physical differences between men and women, pregnancy poses the most difficult problems for applying principles of equality to the realities of difference.

In California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, the Supreme Court upheld a state law providing for "preferential" treatment for pregnant employees. The Court ruled that preferential treatment is consistent with the principles of Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). This case provided a negative answer to the question whether the PDA mandates that pregnant employees receive identical treatment to those suffering other workplace disabilities. Guerra, however, left many other questions unanswered. For example, do situations exist where disparate treatment will be not merely permitted but affirmatively required? How much latitude does the PDA leave to the states to legislatively grant pregnancy benefits? This Note explores the parameters of the PDA, focusing on the possible requirements the Act imposes on employers to accommodate pregnancy as well as the extent and breadth of those accommodations.

How to Cite