

In "El Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos: Pedagogic Reflections," Kathleen Keys shares a case study of a memorial museum, El Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos as a pedagogical site. In the Fall of 2005 in Santiago, Chile, Keys taught a course (titled "Visual Art and Human Rights") for a group of American students studying abroad. Drawing on this experience, Keys discusses how meaningful learning about human rights was experienced through their visit to the memorial museum that documents the brutal regime of Pinochet and its significant human rights abuses enacted upon ordinary Chileans.

Altogether the articles in this issue illustrate the different ways human rights work in art education is enacted as a visual and cultural practice. Drawing on a broader understanding of education that moves beyond schools to include public spaces, hospitals, museums, and children's artwork, they show us the need and relevance of public pedagogy as a site for social transformation and the ways the arts can reveal the invisible operations of power and privilege in our society. From a simple domestic object like the fork, to architectural spaces, to city planning we see the ways the regimes of the visible educate us in particular ways, actively rendering invisible those who live on the margins of our society. This collection of essays is one small gesture towards erasing the images of invisibility.

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Arts Practice as Agency: The Right to Represent and Reinterpret Personal and Social Significance

JAMES HAYWOOD ROLLING, JR.

ABSTRACT

In this article, the author reframes arts practice as agency, the right to represent and reinterpret personal and social significance in a way that contributes a positive self-valuation. A positive self-valuation in turn becomes a berth for the beneficial *habitus* of the individual. Bourdieu (1990/1999) describes *habitus* as the locus of the capacity to generate reasonable, common sense behaviors that are beneficial to others. Arts practices are *herein* theorized as a stock of reasonable, common sense behaviors—making marks, making models, and making "special" aesthetic interventions that signal a person, object, artifact, action, event or phenomenon as uniquely valuable, sacred or life-sustaining. These are behaviors that human agents commonly and continually employ in response to social needs, causes, and the imperative to signify. Given the social significance of arts practice, there is also great potential in a broader application of arts education pedagogy as a force for social transformation. Brent Wilson (2005) sketches out a fundamentally democratic and transactional pedagogical framework that socially responsive and responsible educators can make use of in the cultivation of social justice, the ethical imagination, and the transformation of the systems that ill-define us.

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITY

While it may seem to many that the arts are nice, but not entirely necessary (Eisner, 2002), making art is nevertheless universally practiced in some form by every nation, every people group, and every civilization. If the arts are not necessary, why are they practiced so ubiquitously? For the purposes of this article, I will redefine the practice of making art as the practice of rendering meaning from life experiences either through making marks, making models, or making special—the latter being a concept introduced by anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake (2003).

Rendering meaning artistically from life and thereby leaving behind the residuals of one's existence can be argued as a basic human right largely because all people, all cultures, and all civilizations at one point or another must assert the agency to represent to others that they matter, make a difference, or were simply here. To assert anything less is to accept meaninglessness. Perhaps the most crucial of all human rights is then the right to signify self, to signify experience, affinities, aspirations, beliefs, and ideas. Without the liberty to mark oneself as a person that matters, to model one's personal and social experience to others without censorship, and to make special one's place in the world without

assault, prohibition or diminishment by those who rule or dominate, human agency is curtailed. Agency is conceived here not as the “freedom to do whatever the subject wills but rather freedom to constitute oneself in an unexpected manner—to decode and recode one’s identity” (Stinson, 2004, p. 57).

This right to visibly decode and recode personal and social significance was on display, for example, in the great Harlem Renaissance literary and visual reinterpretation designated as “the New Negro,” wherein the ridiculed, stereotyped and degraded Negro body was reinterpreted as a document of strength and beauty, yet no less Black (Locke, 1925/1992). In addressing the theme of this special issue, I will present arts practice both as the manifestation of a fundamental human right to represent one’s lived experience, and as a responsibility in the reclamation of interpretive and reinterpretive rights neglected.

ARTS PRACTICE AS SELF-DETERMINATION

The practice of interpreting and reinterpreting life meaning, or decoding and recoding the meaning of one’s identity, is the art of self-determination. But it would be simplistic to assume acts of self-determination to be ostensibly self-serving. Self-determination is also an agency for social growth. Olivia Gude (2009) points out the role of self-determination in the development of democracy and vigorous community exchange:

It is useful to remember that as educators we create citizens of a democratic society, not so much by filling students with ideas or facts about democracy, as by creating the conditions through which youth experience the pleasures, anxieties, and responsibilities of democratic life. (Gude, 2009, pp. 7-8)

Creating conditions for students and teachers as agents of non-hierarchical learning communities affording the self-determination of our contributions to democratic society also allows us to “perceive fully, consciously integrate our perceptions into complex constructions, and habitually act on the basis of our deepest awarenesses” (Gude, 2009, p. 8). There are countless historical incidents that can be cited where the residuals of an arts practice went beyond merely demanding the protection of human rights and being *about* something needed, and were instead that very thing that was needed. The Harlem Renaissance and the Black Arts movements were actually human rights movements. Picasso’s Cubist monochromatic painting of *Guernica* innovated a new form for relating the trauma of war atrocities. The populism and protest in Woody Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land,” like the defiant pride in James Brown’s “Say It Loud—I’m Black and I’m Proud,” was musically broadcast to inform United States citizens of beliefs rarely given public expression. The documentary photographs of

Lewis Wickes Hine were activist texts and catalysts for the transformation of workplace policies allowing the use and abuse of child labor in industry. Each of these works of art was an act of self-determination and a needed contribution to democratic life, whether embodying the triumph over trauma, extending the ethical imagination, or contributing toward the dismantling oppressive legacies simply because of their visual emergence. Each time an artistic act distills meaning from experience, it also enriches the exchange of ideas throughout the global commons.

To see the arts as a means of social interpretation and reinterpretation and as a catalyst for personal, interpersonal and social exchange and development, one must first see the arts as an “adaptive, dynamic, goal-seeking, self-preserving, and sometimes evolutionary” *system* for perpetuating the human species (Meadows, 2008, p. 12). I thus claim the arts to be much more than just a generator of activist manifestos, or a universal language for self-expression or a means of crafting meaningful objects with technical precision. In 1776, Richard Price wrote of “that principle of spontaneity or self-determination which constitutes us agents or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly ours, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cause” or external oppressor (cited in Peach, 1979, p. 67). In this light, access to the arts practices are also an extension of this same inalienable right—a self-determinative means through which to aggregate, accommodate, and assimilate ways of thinking not our own and likewise disseminate our own meanings and resources to others.

Without the right to represent self as one sees fit, individuals become invisible. Through the arts, our social constructs, cultures, and civilizations bond and cohere on high moral ground, namely, the agreement to mutually benefit one another such that enduring social structures might be erected. Stuart Hall shares a useful insight regarding human identity construction and site selections for one’s social representations:

[W]e...occupy our identities very retrospectively: having produced them, we then know who we are. We say, “Oh, that’s where I am in relation to this argument and for these reasons.” So, it’s exactly the reverse of what I think is the common sense way of understanding it, which is that we already know our “self” and then put it out there. Rather, having put it into play...we then discover what we are. I think that only then do we make an investment in it, saying, “Yes, I like that position, I am that sort of person, I’m willing to occupy that position.” (as cited in Drew, 1998, p. 173)

Hall is suggesting the ubiquity of a site selection process in acts of self-determination. Along the spectrum from our youngest learners to adult learners, the site selection process in identity construction and accompanying acts of self-determination often presents itself in the form of play and risk-taking. We

first serendipitously select various sites for the construction of an identity in order to differentiate ourselves, locate our peer groups, and find like-minded communities. The early shape of identity can easily shift, and construction sites are typically discarded as easily as they are collected. These sites are also *contested*, primarily by those who have presumed the power throughout history to control the development and the destinies of young learners, people groups, or colonized nations (Rolling 2008a; 2009). Hence, the ability to think critically “is not intended merely to improve test scores” (Garoian, 1999, p. 49); it is a reasoning capacity that transgresses the status quo and its prescribed constraints, opening up space for new possibilities, social exchange, and mutually assured development. Arts practices are manifested as meaning-making systems functioning to delineate and influence the contours of our identities and, by extension, our multiple social worlds (Suominen, 2003). The art classroom actively facilitates the equipment of learners as agents in the representation and reinterpretation of meaning.

THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MAKING MARKS, MAKING MODELS, AND MAKING SPECIAL

In this section, I pose three questions. Firstly, in what way is the act of making marks of social significance? Secondly, can arts practitioners make a meaningful contribution regarding matters pertaining to social justice, global economic development, and the continued viability of the human species in our varied sociobiological environments? And thirdly, do arts practices make possible a kind of social response that is “latent within the structure” of human social behavior (Meadows, 2008, p. 1) and that signals self-determined worth? There is something errant in contemporary valuation regarding the perceived irrelevancy of the arts versus the sciences when it comes to matters of social well-being. Historically, arts practices have been manifested as self-organizing behaviors through which humans construct systems of meaning utilizing medium-specific, language-specific, and/or critical methodologies, all with informational consequences (Rolling, 2008b). Self-organization is defined as the “ability of a system to structure itself, to create new structure, to learn, or diversify” (Meadows, 2008, p. 188). A system is defined as a “set of elements or parts that is coherently organized and interconnected in a pattern or structure” that becomes more than the sum of its parts and “produces a characteristic set of behaviors” classified as its “function” or “purpose” (Meadows, 2008, p. 188). These behaviors involve making marks, making models, and making “special” aesthetic interventions signaling worth.

Making Marks

The arts inform us more deeply of the human experience when *simple symbols* are brought together by the arts practitioner to work in concert as *complex symbols*, often in the development of a larger iconographic system. These complex symbols persist over large periods of time in their ability to inform human beings of diverse systems of cultural practice, behavior, linguistic and metaphorical meaning. For example, the ancient Egyptian ankh is a *simple symbol*, representing life. Ankhs could be found throughout the early Egyptian world, a shape often carved from precious stones like lapis lazuli. Yet when this simple symbol of life was situated by an artist or artisan in the hands of one of the Egyptian gods of the afterlife, whether through marks carved into a pillar that represented Osiris, or through marks painted on a wall that depicted an encounter with Anubis, it suddenly became a *complex symbol*—part of the iconography informing civilizations both past and present of a system of early Egyptian social practices and beliefs surrounding the ability for a prepared mummy to be granted the gift of eternal life after death.

Complex symbols are examples of mark-making behaviors applied to the construction of systems of meaning allowing a larger range of conveyances for representing personal and social significance.

Making Models

My second question asks, in what way can arts practitioners make a valuable contribution regarding matters such as the maintenance of potable water supplies, the proliferation and preparation of food stocks, the conservation and development of energy systems, transportation concepts, health and safety products, or enterprise and entrepreneurship ideas that might turn the tide of global poverty? Emily Pilloton (2009) has written a new book that details a hundred design products that empower people who are typically overlooked by commercial, for-profit designers. Pilloton holds a view of design as activism, as civics, as public health, and as a catalyst for asset development and social capital. There is a false dichotomy too often drawn between artists and designers. Craig A. Elimeliah (2006) points out that because “designers are artists and many artists are designers, the line between the two is complex and intriguing” (para. 4). Art educators, by expanding their tent poles to include design experiments and solutions in their instructional content and curriculum exercises, also serve to expand the relevance of arts practices in response to nagging social problems.

Design is a practice that involves making models. Both the arts and the sciences exercise the making of conceptual models (Gobert & Buckley, 2000; Matthews, 2007; Sullivan 2010), and it is very possible for a design to be derived as a hybrid of both arts-based and science-based inquiry. The one

hundred designs in Pilloton's (2009) book *Design Revolution* are also models of *social entrepreneurship*, defined as locating a problem in society—circumstances and behaviors that are stuck, ineffective, or not working to empower people—and addressing that problem by introducing some kind of reinterpretive transformation into the system that first produced the problem, all the while persuading others to support that transformation/reinterpretation (Boorstein, 2004). Social entrepreneurship designs flow from a critical-theoretic art-making paradigm that interrogates our situated and/or embodied social contexts in acts of appraisal, agitation, and activism (Pearse, 1983; Rolling, 2008b; Sullivan, 2010).

Making Special

My third question asks, do arts practices make possible a kind of social response that is “latent within the structure” of human social behavior (Meadows, 2008, p. 1), generating “special” aesthetic interventions that signal a person, object, artifact, action, event or phenomenon as uniquely valuable, sacred or life-sustaining? Dissanayake (2003) introduces the idea that the arts represent the evolutionary practice of “making special” all that is significant to the life and health of individuals, societies, and civilizations. Dissanayake redefines art as the vast sea of self-organizing and self-perpetuating behaviors through which humans have selected and made “special” certain ideas, actions, events, and/or materials to which they have a natural or selected affinity.

Once a given set of ideas, practices, and/or objects are selected as special, those who have chosen an adherence to the specialness of those totems as part of their constellation of personal identifiers also *ritualize* and reinterpret the act of making those totems special. Arts practices make possible the latent empathetic social response that attracts independent actors to self-organize around the very same totems. To “make special” is also to delineate identity, home, and community. “Making special” is thereby also indicative of self-determinative agency.

SYSTEMS THINKING AND THE RELEVANCE OF ARTS PRACTICES TO THE CAUSE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

In their argument for a pedagogy of social justice art education, Desai and Chalmers (2007) point out that “the power of art to shape our understanding of the world in particular ways” means arts practices should never be assumed either apolitical or uncontested (p. 7). Sites of contention carved out by the arts have indeed been described as “a symbolic battleground” (Shohat & Sham, 1994, p. 183). On the field of contestation—the field of visibility—artists and students of the arts are cultural workers. Visuality has been defined as “how we see, how we

are able, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the unseeing therein” (Foster, 1988, p. ix). Yet if the arts are indeed relevant to social justice concerns and altruistic intent, what is it about certain systems of arts practice that cause them to be misperceived as less than so?

The answer to this question is informed by a basic understanding of systems theory. In systems theory, a *stock* is the “foundation of any system,” the accumulated store of material, information, or “elements of the system that you can see, feel, count, or measure at any given time” (Meadows, 2008, pp. 17–18). The characteristics of a system's stock change over time through inflows and outflows, but those changes are slow enough to serve as a buffer to the system, preserving its behavior efficiently enough for its behavior to remain identifiable. Harold Pearse (1983; 1992) has developed a framework for identifying the prevailing art-making systems (i.e., systems of *production, communication, or reflection*) that currently work in opposition to one another.

An empirical-analytic art-making paradigm defines art as a *system of production*, a cause and effect intervention into a stock of empirical and manipulable elements, a commodity-oriented process “that has as its basic intent a cognitive interest in the control of objects in the world” (Pearse, 1983, p. 159). Within this system, art practices behave to produce a stock of precious objects, requiring a mastery over the techniques necessary to shape them. Consequently, the perception of this art-making system is usually characterized by a parochial, “formalist and art historical view of the Western fine arts tradition...grounded in a specialized aesthetic perspective and high art cultural tradition that is somewhat at odds with the cultural experiences of the multicultural, multiclass public we art educators serve” (Bersson, 1986, p. 41). The artist in a *system of production* is seen as the discipline-based adherent to the technical conventions of their chosen arts specialization.

An interpretive-hermeneutic art-making paradigm defines art as a *system of communication*, the expression of situated knowledge about a person's relationship with his or her social world (Pearse, 1983, p. 160). Within this system, art practices behave to produce a stock of symbolic conveyances of “the ways in which we immediately experience an intimacy with the living world, attending to its myriad textures, sounds, flavors, and gestures” (Cancienne & Snowber, 2003, p. 238). Consequently, the perception of this art-making system is usually characterized by a narrow focus on the genius of the individual, and an “ahistorical/ asocial worldview in which individual development is seen as largely free and independent of social contexts, and its noninvolvement, in terms of practice, with the larger world of social and political activity” (Bersson, 1986, p. 42). The artist in a *system of communication* is seen as the psychologically

integrated, self-realized and solitary actor who voices and champions cultural and aesthetic awareness.

The prior two systems behave in a way that lends toward the general misconception of the arts as uninterested actor in the address of social needs and social justice causes. Here is where a socially responsible art education can be positioned as a change agent on the symbolic field of contest. A critical-theoretic art-making paradigm may be defined as a *system of reflection*, a relativist and liberatory activity rendering invisible assumptions, values, and norms newly visible “in order to transform” and critique unjust social relations and empower marginalized individuals and communities within the arts practitioner’s social world (Pearse, 1983, p. 161). Arts practices under a critical-theoretic paradigm challenge “taken-for-granted theories and concepts that govern our disciplines and circumscribe our thinking” in order to reveal “the ongoing inequity and social injustice that shape our society” (Ladson-Billings, 2003, p. 11).

One can change a system’s behavior either by changing the relationships between the elements or by changing an element so that it “*results in changing relationships or purpose*” (Meadows, 2008, p. 17, emphasis in original). Art-making systems are sub-systems within a larger system of global and multicultural social relationships. We can leverage the stock of any of the previously described art-making systems towards a greater social relevance and means by changing the relationships between systems to “a constant state of flux, a kind of perpetual pluralism” rather than unending competition (Pearse, 1992, p. 250). A postparadigmatic art education curriculum framework provides wider possibilities for connections across systems of art-making and for the “conceptual collage” and reorganization of arts pedagogy and artistic purpose in the postmodern era (Marshall, 2008; Rolling, 2010a).

In a postmodern and socially responsible approach to K-16 art education, art objects are allowed to speak for those who are invisible; expressive voice is expected to agitate for personal change and social justice; iconoclastic concepts may be codified as beautiful and relevant art and design products. Amalgamating the stock of these art-making systems to address social needs and problems also attracts the inflow of other socially responsive elements into the stock of art education practice, for example, welcoming teaching practices that empower people—i.e., the arts and design as activism, as catalyst, as civics, as public health, and as social capital (Pilloton, 2009).

HABITUS, EQUILIBRIUM, AND CULTURAL WORK

A socially responsive and responsible approach to the arts in education works to maintain the characteristics of healthy human agency, community altruism, and

the liberal imagination—a capacity expounded upon by Bourdieu (1990/1999) as the sociological model of human *habitus*:

...an infinite capacity for generating products—thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production...the *habitus* tends to generate all the “reasonable,” “common-sense,” behaviours (and only these) which are possible within the limits of...a particular field. (p. 445)

The idea of habitus as the locus of human agency and the human right to represent and reinterpret one’s personal and social experience also validates self as the site of research, since self is also the site of cultural production and reproduction and a repository of researchable data on the results of this cultural work. For instance, the countercultural movement of the 1960s was the product of citizens returned again to the stock of possibilities that produce identity out of a repertoire of locally accessible stories, rather than the grand metanarrative of homogenous American “progress.” Mark Currie (1998) writes that the self, especially in a postmodern dispensation, “inheres in the relations between a person and others” (p. 17). Participants in the 1960s countercultural movement sought the freedom to remove the social barriers to interact with other bodies as other selves, to interact with other temporal stations of self and multiple, often psychedelic self-images. This is indeed plausible if “personal identity is not...contained in the body,” but rather constituted by a diaphanous array of difference (Currie, 1998, p. 17).

I speak now not of differences counterposed, but of differences imbricated. Currie’s (1998) argument lends to a conception of habitus that is iterated in our learning “to self-narrate from the outside, from other stories, and particularly through the process of identification with other characters” (p. 17). A socially responsive and responsible approach to the arts in education leverages opportunities for the construction of sites of agency engendered through critical reflection and extreme responsiveness. Each pedagogical act is a locally situated and/or embodied cultural work order fulfilled—a transaction between self and society contributing to a complex system-wide behavior. Each transaction causes a ripple effect that alters personal habitus and its social contexts. Given the social significance of making marks, making models, and making special, there is also great potential in arts pedagogy as a force for the transformative reinterpretation of both habitus and society and, ultimately, for greater equity.

I do not suggest arts practice to be an apolitical force for equity in and of itself. That would be naïve. The arts practices must be socially grounded, functioning as part of a fundamentally democratic pedagogical framework, a “means by which spectators/students [of the arts] become critical thinkers and

participate in society as critical citizens” (Garoian, 1999, p. 43). Otherwise, works of art and visuality may easily, for example, become the excrescence of systems of propaganda geared to produce compliance, conformity, and/or inequity as was the case in the films made by Leni Riefenstahl for Adolph Hitler’s 20th century Nazi regime, or is currently the case in the racist imagery and caricatures of President Barack Obama produced by some members of the reactionary Tea Party movement in the 21st century United States.

While it might be counter-argued that one person’s propaganda is another person’s act of self-determination, part and parcel with acts of propaganda is the effort to co-opt, delimit, curtail or outright abolish the self-determination of others. Propaganda distorts agency through the deliberate omission and/or obfuscation of any information that might contest it, thereby fabricating useful fictions and misinformation that work to maintain its primacy in social discourse (Rolling, 2010b). Propaganda seeks to quell or quash the democratic exchange of competing ideas.

Paradoxically, although arts practices that teach us to think empirically in a medium, think expressively in a language, or think iconoclastically within a context are often pitted against one another, they may nevertheless work in concert to provide stations of dynamic equilibrium, third spaces that germinate in the dialectic between two kinds of system dynamics—socially grounded systems of arts practice versus systems of forced compliance, expected conformity, or unyielding inequity within social contexts.

Arriving at equilibrium is a station in the ongoing process of identity formation that is achieved again and yet again, a dynamic balancing and re-balancing of past selves and post-selves “in an ongoing process of change that may continue over the course of the life-span” (Kroger, 1996, p. 147). The development of identity also develops stations of community, those both past and possible. Each station of equilibrium is a site in the development of a beneficial habitus, and becomes a site of personal and social stability. A pedagogical site where personal and social equilibrium has been achieved is unlike those wherein the subject has the “freedom to do whatever the subject wills” without a predetermined purpose, and unlike those wherein a subject is coded by a schooling or controlling system to carry out a designated purpose. Rather, equilibrium or a beneficial habitus is manifested as agency and the freedom to decode and re-code one’s identity in acts of self-selected purpose.

TRANSACTIONAL PEDAGOGY AS THE INCEPTION OF AGENCY

Charles R. Garoian (1999), in his consideration of the liminality of performance art and its manifestation as a transgressive pedagogy, defines the limen as “a threshold, a border, a neutral zone between ideas, cultures, or territories that one

must cross to get from one side to the other” (p.40)—a contentious place where our prescriptions of persons and stories of social categories may be demarcated and held in tension, conflicting with one another to be named and un-named. I am attracted to Garoian’s performance pedagogy because of its ready acceptance of contentiousness as an ingredient in pedagogy; the affordances of contentious liminality in educational settings are akin to the unscriptedness in human experience. One must first navigate contentiousness to arrive at equilibrium.

The trafficking of embodied contentions and messy minds, where habitus is understood to be both/and rather than either/or, are juxtaposed within a polemical space where “meaning is contested and struggled for in the interstices *in between* structures” (Conquergood, 1991, p.184). Located in human thought practices, the site of sociocultural contention is also then a “criti/politi/cal” identity, or in other words, a critical citizen and a social agent invested with the power to govern local sites of meaning (Rolling, 2007). Following Garoian’s (1999) argument, when zones of contention become pedagogical strategy, educational enterprise takes a decidedly postmodern turn as spectators/students are taught how “cultural identity work functions politically to achieve agency within schooled culture” (p. 44).

Brent Wilson (2005) sketches out a fundamentally democratic and transactional pedagogical framework that socially responsive and responsible educators can make use of, describing three pedagogical sites, areas of contestation in the development of a beneficial overarching habitus. The first site is “the vast ‘territory’ containing many informal spaces outside of and beyond classrooms where kids...both construct their own visual cultural texts and consume the visual cultural texts made by others” (Wilson, 2005, p. 18). This is the pedagogical site in which the subject is freest to do whatever he or she wills in parsing and making sense of the ambiguous worlds in which they navigate. While what is constructed is often considered to be play, it is also cultural work that is worthy of study for its improvisatory, spontaneous, and self-initiated qualities (Ulbricht, 2005; Wilson, 1974; Wilson, 2005). Whether described as deriving from play or from increasingly sophisticated acts of improvisation, it is important to note that this first pedagogical site does not require a predetermined purpose to direct it.

Wilson (2005) describes the second pedagogical site as “conventional art classrooms in schools (or museums and community art classrooms) where teachers direct student artmaking” (p. 18). This is the pedagogical site in which the subject is most likely to be coded by “normative instructional strategies founded on Cartesian-based subject-object binaries, the rationalism of the Enlightenment project, and the positivism of modern art and science” (Garoian, 1999, p. 43). The coding of identities in modern popular and visual culture has long been “a means of identifying, classifying, and policing” the masses and ultimately became

central to “the development of scientific and pseudo-scientific practices in relation to mental illness, physiognomy, phrenology, and social Darwinist race theories” (Popple, 2005, p. 95).

Finally, Wilson’s “third pedagogical site” is described as “a site where adults and kids collaborate in making connections and interpreting webs of relationships... among the images that kids make for themselves and the images that adults ask them to make” (2005, p. 18). Wilson makes the argument that in the third pedagogical site, students are equal partners and agents with teachers in making sense of ideas and their meanings across a plurality of thresholds of pedagogical interaction. This interaction across multiple pedagogical sites can have a profound governing influence on our thinking about how “children’s images...art and art education, narrative, [and] popular visual culture” relate to the world (Wilson, 2005, p. 18).

Wilson thus outlines what he calls a “transactional pedagogy” that crosses the boundaries between these three pedagogical sites as constituted in the lives of multiple agents, transactions consisting of “teachers’ values, students’ values, texts, images, interpretations, and conflicting interpretations” in a network of “visual cultural texts” wherein any “text that members of learning communities deem sufficiently important to either interpret or create is given status” (2005, p. 19, emphasis in original). It is in the multiplicities of the third pedagogical site—a third space—that learners are afforded with repeated opportunities to develop the agency to decode and recode identity and ideas in transactions that are often unexpected.

Julia Marshall (2008) presents the ceramics work of Charles Krafft as one exemplar of an arts practice that juxtaposes, decontextualizes, and blends competing paradigms to work in fellowship with one another in pieces such as “Fragmentation Hand Grenade.” Working within a third space, Krafft simultaneously produces precious forms through the beautiful craftwork and decorative styling of traditional Delft porcelains, communicates situated knowledge about weapons dealt by arms traders in Slovenia, and critiques “the banality and ordinariness of violence in American life” (Marshall, 2008, p. 41). Marshall’s presentation of Krafft’s postparadigmatic and transactional art practice also invites a similar reconceptualization of 21st century art education practice, one that accommodates learning outcomes by our students which simultaneously decorate, communicate, and critique. Such are the unexpected choices that yield agency in learners.

A transactional pedagogical framework thus becomes the locus of cultural work—inceptions that are productive in the generation of those reasonable, common sense behaviors with the greatest potential to reinterpret both personal habitus and society, and to aid the establishment of greater social/global equity. Learners need only to be given the opportunity.


CONCLUSION

When we argue to preserve a symphony orchestra on the verge of bankruptcy because of the beautiful pieces of music they produce, we obscure the fact that some music is intended solely for the communication and celebration of cultural significance, while other music is intended to expose and defy unjust forms of power. Yet all are manifestations of art-making systems. Further, each approach to artmaking practice is a human right. The significance of making marks, making models, and making special is in the generation of agency for a socially responsive and responsible living in a democratic society. Francis A. J. Ianni’s (1968) anthropological reflections on the arts as agents for social change remain relevant as he long ago surmised that in the cultivation of social justice, altruistic intent and the liberal imagination, “we know that education is to be the major weapon and that we need only decide how we are going to use it” (p. 16). By reframing our arts practices as primary sites in the development of agency and a mutually beneficial habitus, they are poised and at the ready to be employed in support of our inalienable right to represent and reinterpret self and society.

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The Fork

Written and Illustrated by Rachel Marie-Crane Williams

As my Grandmother's body and mind became unfamiliar, we slowly decided that she needed to leave her home.

In small bits and pieces we took away her autonomy, privacy, mobility and, in some ways, her dignity.

On the day she moved we packed up 94 years' worth of pictures, dishes, photographs, pots and pans, clothes, books, papers, and furniture.

Some went to family members, some to friends, and what was left went into the dumpster or to charity.

We replaced her old familiar things with new things that weren't soiled and were easier to care for or dispose of in the future. We decided she needed just "the essentials," a microwave and a new set of "picnic ware" from the local K-Mart.

The cheery pattern on the plastic handles of the forks, spoons, and knives watched the rims on the melamine dishes, mugs, and bowls. The set came in one box.

James Haywood Rolling, Jr. is Associate Professor and Chair of Art Education at the College of Visual and Performing Arts and School of Education at Syracuse University. He can be contacted at jrolling@syr.edu