Abstract

In this Article I want to examine Nozick's claim that recognition of moral rights precludes the legitimacy of any state more extensive than that tolerated by the libertarian. This is to examine a claim which is crucial to Nozick's position, for, on his view, the nature of rights largely determines the extent of legitimate interference with individual liberty. I shall advance the thesis that rights do not have the libertarian implications Nozick attributes to them and that the libertarian view cannot be defended on the basis of rights. By so doing, I hope not only to undermine Nozick's defense of libertarianism, but also to defend rights against the rather bad reputation they have begun to acquire because of their association with libertarianism. That is, for those who find libertarianism impossible to tolerate, and who accept Nozick's claims about the relationship between rights and libertarianism, a plausible solution would be the rejection of rights along with libertarianism. By denying the connection between rights and libertarianism, I hope to undercut both uses of the claim that the connection exists.

There are various ways in which one could undertake an examination of the sort I have in mind. One line of attack would be to establish the existence of rights more extensive than those recognized by Nozick—rights which would directly require redistribution. While I would be sympathetic to such an approach, I shall not adopt it here. Instead, I shall argue that the rights Nozick does recognize themselves entail that the state can justifiably exercise powers with respect to property and economic activity which are more extensive than a libertarian can allow. To establish this thesis, I shall initially set out some of the more distinctively libertarian aspects of the position Nozick adopts. Then I shall offer two largely independent arguments designed to show that this libertarian position cannot be defended in the way Nozick attempts to do so: First, I shall argue that mere understanding of what having a right entitles one to protect against can establish the legitimacy of the more than minimal state; second, an examination of the relationship between rights and distributive justice yields a case for an even more extensive state.

How to Cite