Abstract

Few constitutional issues have been so extensively debated without a resolution by the Supreme Court as the validity of federal restrictions on corporate and union political activity. Commentators have exhaustively discussed the pertinent congressional enactments and their legislative histories, the relatively few judicial decisions, and the practical political consequences of federal intervention.

Rather than repeat these numerous analyses, this Article will attempt to place the issue of restrictions on corporate and union political activity in a more general context, and to examine some aspects of the continuing debate that have not received adequate attention. By so doing, we find—perhaps paradoxically—that the issues, with one important exception, are much simpler than they seem to be at first. The thesis can be readily stated: Corporations and unions, like all other interest groups, have important political goals which they seek to implement through diverse means. Despite numerous legislative efforts to prohibit corporate and union political activity, the courts have repeatedly "amended" such statutes in order to avoid considering difficult constitutional issues. The result is a statutory framework that cannot be rationally justified on the basis of the original prohibitionist impulses. We are therefore left with a haphazard structure that satisfies no one. The solution is plain. Regulation of corporate and union political activity should be assimilated into the overall scheme for regulating campaign finance.

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