Abstract

Comment: Evidence
Over the years, the law of presumptions has been the source of much confusion and controversy. Yet, with careful study, evidence law reveals relatively clear guidelines for understanding and applying presumptions. This Comment will explore a small area of the law of presumptions: the extent to which a court may instruct a jury on presumptions and inferences in a criminal trial.

Although courts often blur the distinction between presumptions and inferences, they have generally reached a consensus on when a criminal jury may be instructed on such matters. The Oregon Supreme Court case of State v. Rainey represents a substantial deviation from that consensus. At Rainey's trial, the judge instructed the jury that "proof of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is prima facie evidence of knowledge of its character." The jury found Rainey guilty of delivery of a controlled substance. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the ground that the above instruction was error since no rational connection existed between the fact of delivery and knowledge of the nature of the substance delivered. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, finding the challenged instruction improper in a criminal trial because it constituted a presumption against the defendant. Moreover, the court stated in dictum that instructions on inferences should also be prohibited. A court adopting the Rainey analysis could never instruct the criminal jury on inferences or presumptions, because a rational jury could interpret even a permissive inference as a mandate to find against the defendant.

The Oregon Supreme Court makes a compelling argument for its radical approach in Rainey. The purpose of this Comment is to show that, upon closer analysis, the Rainey court's dramatic departure from the general trend in other jurisdictions does not seem justifiable nor likely to have a major effect on the law of presumptions.

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