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Defining "Handicap" for Purposes of Employment Discrimination

Abstract

In 1973, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act to provide a comprehensive scheme of protections designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.  Since that time, nearly every state has enacted statutory protections for handicapped persons in the workplace. More than in any other area of civil rights litigation, the effectiveness of these protections has turned on the definition given to the protected class—both in the manner in which the legislature has chosen to define "handicap," and in the ways in which the courts have construed and interpreted that definition.

The lack of a uniform definition for a handicapped person has compounded the difficulties in determining the number of Americans who are handicapped  and what percentage of those are being discriminated against. The statistical evidence that is available has shown that only a small percentage of capable, handicapped people in this country are actually in the workforce. Moreover, unemployment rates among handicapped individuals are estimated to be between fifty and seventy-five percent.

In order to ensure that federal and state statutory protections that are in place will lead to realizing the policy behind the protections—equal opportunity for all handicapped people who could be working—courts and legislators must face the difficult threshold issue of who is intended to be covered by these laws. This Note examines the definition of "handicap" as it has been applied in antidiscrimination law, specifically focusing on the comprehensive definition provided in the Federal Rehabilitation Act and the variety of definitions contained in state statutory provisions. This Note discusses the ways in which courts have interpreted the statutory definitions. It looks in some detail at the Supreme Court decision construing the Rehabilitation Act definition, School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, and reviews a number of recent state court opinions concerning state statutory definitions of "handicap." Finally, this Note scrutinizes the Arizona handicap discrimination statute and its somewhat unusual definition of "handicap."

How to Cite

30 Ariz. L. Rev. 633 (1988)

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