Abstract

Two separate admissibility standards govern the admission of novel scientific evidence—the Frye standard and the relevancy standard. This Note examines these two standards, and in particular focuses on each standard's role in rejecting DNA typing evidence that has unsound analytical underpinnings or inadequate quality assurance procedures. This Note argues that these two governing standards of admissibility do not allow the criminal defendant the ability to defend adequately against potentially prejudicial and unreliable scientific evidence.

Part I of this Note focuses on the scientific aspects of DNA typing, both in theory and in practice. Part II examines the two legal standards—Frye and relevancy—that govern the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, and the shortcomings of each standard. This Note analyzes several of the DNA cases that utilize these models and then compares these cases to Arizona trial courts' treatment of this evidence. Part III discusses the adversary and the jury systems and demonstrates that the criminal defendant is unable to defend against faulty DNA evidence once it reaches the jury. Part IV argues for heightened scrutiny at the pre-trial level, so that courts admit DNA evidence only after determining that the results are reliable and that the testing procedures have been properly performed. This Note argues that the judge should determine most questions regarding the technique as a matter of law at pre-trial proceedings, instead of allowing the trier of fact to weigh the evidence during the trial.

How to Cite