Abstract

The first part of this Note examines the historical background of the attorney-client privilege, the policy bases for the privilege, and how the privilege applies to corporations. The next section examines the various tests used by the judiciary to determine the extent of the privilege when applied to corporations. This section is followed by a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's broad definition of the extent of the attorney-corporate client privilege. Next, this Note discusses Samaritan Foundation and the approaches taken by the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court in defining the scope of the attorney-corporate client privilege. This Note then compares the Arizona State Legislature's definition of the attorney-corporate client privilege's scope with both the United States Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn and the Arizona Supreme Court's holding in Samaritan Foundation. This Note concludes that Arizona's new approach may serve the attorney-client privilege's policy of clear application. However, this Note also concludes that, overall, Arizona's new definition of the attorney-corporate client privilege is too broad and undermines the attorney-client privilege's policies of fairness and availability of information. This Note proposes a modification of the privilege's definition which would cure these problems.

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