Abstract
This article explores the reasons behind courts' reluctance to grant emotional distress damages to persons who suffer economic harms as a direct result of a defendant's negligence. This article examines the policies and existing rules used to deny recovery, arguing that they provide neither a fair nor workable model for courts to use in, determining whether a plaintiff may bring suit, and ultimately, recover for her injury. It argues for courts to adopt a two-pronged approach: first, to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, either one implied by law, assumed by the defendant or arising out of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; and only then to determine whither the injury suffered is serious enough to warrant recovery. This conceptual framework strikes a balance between the policies underlying tort law and the interest of the individual injured plaintiff.
How to Cite
37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1247 (1995)
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