Abstract

In a recent book, I set out the contours of a conception of corrective justice, and tentatively explored aspects of its relationship to Anglo-American tort law. I argued that corrective justice is the principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice. One could object to my argument on at least two grounds. One might accept my characterization of corrective justice, but deny that, so conceived, it is reflected in our tort practices,2 or one might reject my conception of corrective justice.

In obvious ways, this second concern is more fundamental. Perhaps I see so much (or so little) corrective justice in tort law simply because I have such a confused idea about what corrective justice is. In any case, the extent to which I see corrective justice in tort law surely depends on my understanding of it; the same is true of any would-be corrective justice account of tort law—Weinrib's, Fletcher's and Epstein's, as well as mine. So it is only natural to ask whether any of us is right about the content of corrective justice. And that requires an account of what it means to say that a particular conception of a concept like corrective justice is correct, as well as an account of the adequacy conditions of such a judgment.

In this brief essay, I want to tackle some of these meta-ethical concerns. Before doing so, however, I want to outline the way in which corrective justice figures in my general approach to political philosophy.

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