Abstract

In this Article, Professor Fisch analyzes the application of the reforms to private securities fraud litigation adopted by the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, focusing in particular on the lead plaintiff provision. The Article describes the factors motivating the reforms, particularly the observation that securities fraud litigation is lawyer driven. The Article evaluates the likelihood that the legislative changes will result in greater institutional investor involvement in securities fraud litigation and the capacity of that involvement to influence the perceived problems with the litigation process.

Professor Fisch then demonstrates how the experience of securities litigation reform can provide greater insight into the recent proposals to reform class action litigation more generally through proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23. She cautions reformers to consider more carefully both the purposes of the class action vehicle and the possibility that efforts to increase client involvement in the class action format may increase collusive behavior. Finally, the Article suggests that developments in mass tort cases may, in turn, offer lessons for securities litigation.

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