Abstract
There has been a great deal of debate over the virtue of securities class actions. In this Article, Professor Cox examines whether the commentators and empiricists have addressed the right questions in their battles over whether reform of the securities class action is a menace. Since so much of the debate centers on whether class actions serve either a compensatory or deterrent function, this Article examines available data and concludes that securities class actions are largely compensatory. Moreover, Professor Cox argues that entity liability, rather than solely individual liability, is consistent with the deterrence of securities violations. The procedural changes introduced by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 are explained as filling the void created by the courts failing to aggressively discharge their supervisory role in class action litigation. Against the the background of his analysis of the Reform Act's provisions, Professor Cox suggests who is the guardian of the securities class action's virtue.
How to Cite
39 Ariz. L. Rev. 497 (1997)
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