Abstract

Since 1992, several states have enacted legislation that allows for the involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders. These sexually violent persons statutes have been held to be constitutional by the United States Supreme Court so long as a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the individual previously convicted of a sexual offense suffers from a mental disability or personality disorder, and (2) the mental disability or personality disorder makes it likely that the individual will commit sexually violent acts in the future.

However, until recently, courts have grappled with the issue of whether the Constitution requires a finding that the sexually violent person's mental disorder renders him dangerous beyond his control. In State v. Ehrlich, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed this issue of involuntariness. The Arizona Supreme Court's holding adopted the majority view that the Constitution does not require a finding of involuntariness. The subsequent holding of the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane articulates a new constitutional requirement for sexually violent persons statutes and indirectly calls into question the holding rendered by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Ehrlich.

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