Abstract
This Article analyzes privatized welfare services from the standpoint of the nondelegation doctrine in constitutional law and economic incentive theories. While delegations of governmental power to administrative agencies are relatively uncontroversial, delegations of adjudicative powers to private parties have always presented special constitutional concerns for the courts. The relatively new practice of making governmental delegations via commercial contracts with private vendors raises controversial issues, as the contracts tend to create perverse incentives for the contracting firms to deny or delay claims for welfare benefits in order to increase corporate profits. This Article argues that perverse incentives are more or less inherent in the process of contracting with for-profit corporations to perform these traditional governmental functions, and recommends that policy makers exercise great caution in pursuing these public-private partnerships for the administration of welfare services.
How to Cite
45 Ariz. L. Rev. 83 (2003)
7
Views
2
Downloads