Abstract
With neither statutory proscriptions to uphold nor a clear statement of what they were trying to do, federal judges in the United States have deemed stereotyping actionable at law. The judges who built this cause of action moved fast, as "stereotype" in its modern sense is relatively new. What explains stereotyping as a legal wrong? Exploring the concept of a stereotype as presented by its coiner, the public intellectual Walter Lippmann, this Article argues that what's wrong with stereotyping is unjustifiable constraint.
An answer to the question of what's wrong delivers other answers as well. This Article shows how current American law and legal institutions exacerbate the problem of stereotyping as well as lessen it. It says which stereotypes fall outside the ken of legal remediation. It distinguishes stereotyping from discrimination. It locates the constitutional law of stereotyping. In its last Part, using examples, it tells how law and legal institutions repair this wrong.
How to Cite
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 655 (2013)
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